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ADDRESSING AMERICA’S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: IS THERE A ROLE FOR
RELIGIOUS THINKING?
Benjamin M. Friedman
*
The economy had been weak for several years, with business sharply depressed in key
industries.  Millions of Americans were losing not just their jobs but their houses too.  The
political climate was angry.  Especially in the middle of the country, and in the West, protest was
in the air.  Populist groups, often with a militant anti-government agenda, and sometimes tinged
by ugly racial or religious prejudices too, were active and gaining strength; there was even talk of
a third-party movement.  It was clear to many thoughtful citizens that the U.S. economy needed
to change direction, not just to begin recovering from the unusually severe business-cycle
downturn but to regain a trajectory in which average families would once again see an
improvement over time in their living standards.  In response, several dozen men, many of them
closely affiliated with the call for economic reform coming from the nation’s Protestant churches,
met to organize a new group to further the study of these economic problems in the hope of
laying the intellectual basis for a way forward.
The year was 1885.  The place, Saratoga Springs, New York.  The Protestant movement
from which many of the meeting’s participants drew their inspiration was the Social Gospel,-2-
spurred by leaders like Washington Gladden, minister of the First Congregational Church in
Columbus, Ohio (earlier the religious editor of the New York Independent), and Moderator of the
National Council of Congregational Churches; Josiah Strong, minister of the Central
Congregational Church in Cincinnati, and General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance for the
United States; and Walter Rauschenbusch, soon to become minister at New York’s Second
German Baptist Church (and founder of the Brotherhood of the Kingdom).  Their stated aim was
to restore an active role for the Protestant churches in addressing the economic and social
problems of the day.  The leaders of the meeting at Saratoga Springs included John Bates Clark,
who shortly became the new organization’s president, and who had initially planned to study for
the Congregational ministry at the Yale Divinity School but ended up choosing to enter the new
field of economics instead, and Richard T. Ely, who served as the organization’s secretary for its
first seven years, during this period writing a book titled Social Aspects of Christianity, and in
time also went on to become the organization’s president.  The organization they founded was
the American Economic Association.  The AEA remains today the flagship professional
association for economists in the United States.  
Today many Americans again have the sense that our economy is not well serving
ordinary working citizens and their families.  Now, as then, many who share this feeling are
active in the country’s religious life – not just in the Protestant churches but among Catholics,
Jews, and other groups as well.  But today the idea of an active role for the nation’s religious
establishment in determining new economic directions seems remote.  Religion and economics
mostly occupy different continents on the sphere of our political affairs, and even of our political
thinking.  The same is true in our intellectual life.  Universities like Harvard and Yale have-3-
outstanding economics department, and fine divinity schools too.  They are far apart physically,
and the intellectual interaction is, if anything, even less than what the spatial separation alone
might warrant.
As the circumstances surrounding the founding of the American Economic Association
suggest, this was not always so.  Indeed, there is reason to think that the influence of religious
thinking was essential to the creation of economics as we know it as an intellectual discipline, in
the eighteenth century.  Adam Smith and his contemporaries lived in a time when religion was
both more pervasive and more central than anything we know in today’s Western world.  Just as
important, intellectual life was far more integrated then.  Not only were the sciences and the
humanities (to use today’s language) normally discussed in the same circles, and often by the
same individuals, but theology too was part of the ongoing discussion.  
When Smith and his fellow moral philosophers dined out (Smith’s academic title was
Professor of Moral Philosophy, and there was then no such word as “economics” in regular
usage), their regular interlocutors included professional divines.  Of the 100+ members of the
Select Society, Edinburgh’s elite dining and debate club to which Smith, David Hume, Adam
Ferguson and most of the distinguished Scottish economic thinkers of that day belonged,
fourteen were ministers, including Ferguson himself as well as William Robertson, principal of
Edinburgh University and the leader of the Moderate party in the Church of Scotland.  The
Moderates dominated the Scottish church during the 1760s and 1770s, and Smith was very much
a part of the “Moderate literati” circle.  His teacher, Francis Hutcheson, had been the principal
philosophical mentor of Smith’s contemporaries among the Moderates.  Smith’s admiration,
expressed in The Wealth of Nations, was straight forward: “There is scarce perhaps to be found-4-
any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the
greater part of the presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland and Scotland.”
Smith and his contemporaries, therefore, were continually exposed to what were then
current debates, tensions and new ideas in theology, in the same way that most economists in
university life today might be exposed to thinking in physics, or biology, or demography.  And in
the same way that economists today often draw on ideas from those other lines of inquiry – think
of “gravity” models of international trade, or “penetration” models of technology transfer, or
“migration” models of how industries spread – the eighteenth-century thinkers who created what
became the field of economics could easily have been influenced by what they heard, and read,
and saw, of religious thinking.  The idea here is not that Smith, or any of the others, self-
consciously sought to bring religious principles to bear on their writings in moral philosophy. 
Rather, the theological ideas to which they were exposed helped shape the pre-analytic vision (to
use Joseph Schumpeter’s phrase for it) that they brought to their new thinking.
What was at issue in the Moderates-versus-Evangelicals debate in Scotland during much
of Smith’s pre-Wealth of Nations lifetime, as well as in the Latitudinarian debate in England that
was at its height in the half-century or so before Bernard Mandeville wrote The Fable of the
Bees, which importantly anticipated some of Smith’s insights, was a highly significant and
contentious change in thinking encompassing at least four key elements that were, at the very
least, strikingly congruent with aspects of the transition in economic thinking from dismissal of
the “vicious” pursuit of self-interest (which people may not have perceived correctly anyway) to
the recognition that behavior motivated by self-interest could, and under the right conditions
would, lead to more broadly beneficial outcomes: (1) from belief in “utter depravity” toward-5-
belief in inherent goodness, and potential eligibility for salvation, of all individuals; (2) from
belief in predestination, in particular with no role for human choice or action to affect who is
saved and who is not, toward belief not only that anyone can potentially be saved but that
individuals’ choices and actions – human agency – play a role in this determination; (3) from
belief that the sole reason man exists is the glorification of God toward belief that human
happiness is also a legitimate, divinely intended end; and (4) from a deep-rooted eschatological
pessimism toward the postmillennial belief, at least in some quarters, in the prospect of a future
era of better existence that will be part of human history and, further, that human agency has a
role in bringing this era about.
To be sure, the mapping from these four elements of the transition in religious thinking to
the subsequent transition in economic thinking is far from exact.  But there is a striking
coherence nonetheless.  The belief that men and women are born with an inherent goodness is
surely more suggestive that they can understand their self interest, especially if human happiness
is a divinely warranted end of man’s existence, than if they are utterly depraved in the religious
sense.  The belief that all men and women are potentially eligible for salvation – and,
importantly, that human agency is a part of what enables that salvation – is clearly more
suggestive of Smith’s crucial insight that individuals’ acting in their correctly perceived self-
interest can improve not only their lives but those of their fellow creatures too, compared to the
predestinarian belief that only some are saved and human agency has no bearing on the matter. 
In the same vein, the belief that progress in living conditions brought about by human agency not
only is possible but helps bring the millennium nearer in time is likewise far more consistent with
the same idea about the favorable consequences – for themselves as well as others – of-6-
individuals’ acting in their own self interest in the economic sphere.  (Indeed, as
postmillennialism went on to gain strength, in the nineteenth century, salient economic and
scientific advances like the laying of the first trans-Atlantic telegraph cable were greeted in many
Protestant circles as having millennarian implications.)
Surely no one would suggest that any of these four elements of the transition in religious
thinking that was under such widespread debate during Adam Smith’s day was strictly necessary
for the momentous transition in economic thinking that he initiated, nor that even all four
together were sufficient.  But in light of the readily apparent resonances between these new ideas
and the key elements of Smith’s reasoning, it is plausible that the transition in theological
thinking helped create a new view of individuals’ role in the world – a different pre-analytic
vision – that was highly conducive to the Smithian revolution, and that the four taken together
importantly helped foster its subsequent acceptance.
If the very emergence of economics as a recognizable intellectual discipline with a field
of inquiry and analytical apparatus distinctly its own, out of the revolution culminating in
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, was in significant part the product of ongoing changes in religious
thinking, there is certainly ample precedent for supposing that religious thinkers have standing
from which to take a view on the economic issues of our day as well.  For many citizens today,
economic conditions in America are no less worrying than they were when Gladden and Strong
and Rauschenbusch energized not only their congregants but what became the American
economics profession too.  
The recent financial crisis has sharply depressed many citizens’ incomes.  But
importantly, the problem dates to well before the crisis began.  Even before the onset of the latest-7-
recession, most Americans had seen little economic improvement throughout the last decade.  In
2007 the median family income (the income of families exactly in the middle of the U.S. income
distribution) was $63,700 in today’s dollars.  Back in 2000 the median family income, again in
today’s dollars, was $63,400.  The gain – not per annum, but over the entire seven years – was
less than one-half of one percent.  To be sure, the U.S. economy as a whole expanded solidly
during these years; but the gains from increased production accrued very narrowly, mostly to
people already at the top of the scale. 
Then came the economic downturn triggered by the crisis.  In 2008 the median family
income fell, to $61,500: a lower level than in any year since 1998.  We do not yet have the figure
for 2009, but it seems clear that last year family incomes declined again.  Nor do we have any
solid basis for expecting a rapid recovery of incomes now that the worst of the crisis has passed
and our economy has started to turn around.  
History suggests that the consequences of this kind of prolonged stagnation will spill over
well beyond the realm of business and economics.  In the United States past episodes of
economic frustration on this scale have inflicted collateral damage on our race relations, our
religious tolerance, our generosity toward the disadvantaged (as Adam Smith also observed,
“before we can feel much for others, we must in some measure be at ease ourselves; if our own
misery pinches us very severely, we have no leisure to attend to that of our neighbor), and the
civility of our political discourse.  Given the country’s historical demographic make-up, the most
frequently observed reaction has been a hardening of attitudes toward new and recent
immigrants.  The symptoms differ from one historical episode to the next, but the disease of-8-
economic stagnation is never a pleasant one.  We are already beginning to see some of these
pathologies today.
Moreover, these pathologies – or, when incomes are rising, their opposite – are
presumably matters of concern to our religious leaders no less than Americans active in other
spheres.  Our historical experience makes clear that the eras in which economic expansion has
delivered ongoing material benefits to the majority of the country’s citizens have mostly
corresponded to eras when opportunities and freedoms have broadened, our political institutions
have become more democratic, and the treatment of our society’s unfortunates has become more
generous.  When incomes have stagnated or declined, reaction and retreat have been the order of
the day.  (A major exception was the depression of the 1930s, which instead led to a significant
opening of American society and strengthening of American democracy – perhaps because the
economic distress then was so severe, and so widespread, that the sense of being together in the
same sinking ship overwhelmed the more competitive instincts that usually prevail when people
realize they are not getting ahead.)
Nor is America the only Western democracy where a connection between rising living
standards and the strengthening of democratic freedoms is evident.  Other countries’ histories
display similar patterns.  Conversely, many of the horrifying anti-democratic phenomena that so
marred Europe’s twentieth-century experience ensued in a setting of pervasive economic
stagnation or decline.  Hitler’s rise to power in the wake of the economic and political chaos of
the Weimar Republic is a familiar story, but it is worth recalling that as late as 1928 the Nazi
party drew only 2.8 percent of the vote in German national elections.  What made the difference,-9-
soon thereafter, was the onset of the Great Depression, which affected Germany more than any
other European country. 
The urgent need, therefore, is not merely to get our economy’s production increasing and
let people go back to work, although that is a necessary first step, but to set our economy on a
path that will once again enable the majority of American families to earn rising incomes and
enjoy improving living standards over time.  Most of our citizens have exhibited impressive
patience.  It is best not to try that patience too far.  If a key part of what matters for tolerance and
fairness and opportunity, not to mention the strength of our democratic political institutions, is
that the broad cross-section of the population have a confident sense of getting ahead
economically, then no society – no matter how rich it is or how well-formed its institutions may
be – is immune from seeing its basic democratic values at risk whenever the majority of its
citizens lose their sense of economic progress.  
These issues – economic issues in the first instance, but ultimately far more than that –
are rightly the concern of America’s religious thinkers no less than anyone else.  After all, the
influence of religious thinking was there at the beginning – both the intellectual beginning and
the organizational beginning too.